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Preface
Boston charter schools are making a substantive difference in the lives of their students. For 
the Boston Foundation, recognition of this began in 2009, when we partnered with the Massa-
chusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to publish an Understanding 
Boston report that compared the results of students in Boston’s charter schools, pilot schools 
and traditional schools. 
The report, Informing the Debate, by a team of researchers from MIT and Harvard, which used 
data from the state, followed individual students over time. While it showed few advantages 
for students attending pilot schools, which the Boston Foundation had heavily invested in at 
the time, it did show that charter schools—at both the middle and high school levels—had 
a decidedly positive impact on student achievement. The results in math achievement for 
middle-school students were nothing short of remarkable. 
Informing the Debate helped to fuel the movement to partially lift the cap on charter schools in 
Massachusetts, spurred by President Barack Obama’s Race to the Top federal funding strat-
egy for education, which emphasizes innovation and encourages the establishment of more 
charter schools. Inspired by the potential for federal funds for education, in the spring of 2009 
Governor Deval Patrick announced support for in-district charter schools. On a local level, 
Mayor Thomas M. Menino filed legislation that would allow local school districts to open new, 
district-run charter schools.
In January of 2010, a major education reform act was passed in Massachusetts. Through our 
convening of the Race to the Top Coalition, the Boston Foundation was proud to play a key 
role in the passage of An Act Relevant to the Achievement Gap, which, among other advances, 
doubled the number of charter school seats in the state.
In February of this year, Stanford University’s Center for Research on Education Outcomes 
published a study showing dramatic results for Massachusetts’s charter schools—especially 
those in Boston. Boston charter students had gains equating more than 12 months of additional 
learning in a year in reading and 13 months in math. 
This report, by a team from MIT’s School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative (SEII), which 
includes some members from the team behind Informing the Debate, also produces powerful 
evidence on charter effectiveness. It focuses on Boston’s charter high schools and finds gains 
in MCAS, Advanced Placement and SAT scores. It also shows that students from charter high 
schools are more likely to attend four-year rather than two-year colleges, which means that 
they will be better prepared for jobs in our competitive innovation economy.
Paul S. Grogan
President and CEO 
The Boston Foundation
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Charter Schools in Massachusetts
Twenty years ago, the Massachusetts Education Reform 
Act of 1993 set in motion a series of major new initia-
tives to equalize funding across the Commonwealth, 
improve the quality of teaching, and strengthen account-
ability for school performance.  Among other impor-
tant innovations, MERA established the Massachusetts 
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) to inform 
curriculum and instruction and evaluate the perfor-
mance of students, schools and districts. Also as part of 
the Act, the first charter schools were permitted to open 
in Massachusetts.  
Charter schools are similar in many respects to other 
public schools. Because their charters are granted by 
the state, however, charter schools are not subject to 
the supervision of local school committees or super-
intendents and their personnel are typically outside 
local collective-bargaining agreements. Charter schools 
are free to structure their curriculum and school envi-
ronment. For instance, many charter schools fit more 
instructional hours into a year by running longer school 
days and providing instruction during the summer. In 
exchange for this added flexibility, charter schools are 
required to meet the standards and goals laid out in 
their charters. Schools that fail to do so may lose their 
right to operate as a publicly funded school. Charter 
schools are open to any child, free of charge. If more 
children want to enroll in a charter school than it has 
space for, an admissions lottery is held.
In 2009, the Boston Foundation partnered with the 
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Second-
ary Education to publish Informing the Debate, an 
in-depth analysis of the effect of Boston’s charter schools 
on standardized test scores. The present report builds 
on this earlier study, and is the product of a research 
team that includes four authors who contributed to the 
earlier report. This new report was produced under the 
auspices of MIT’s School Effectiveness and Inequality 
Initiative (SEII), using the same data sources and empiri-
cal methods as used for the 2009 report. Specifically, 
both reports rely on charter school admissions lotteries 
to make “apples to apples” comparisons that capture the 
causal effect of charter attendance. 
Informing the Debate showed that Boston middle and 
high school charter schools boost student achievement 
markedly, especially in math. This new report assesses 
the effect of Boston’s charter high schools on student 
outcomes beyond MCAS test scores.  We focus on 
outcomes that are either essential for or facilitate post-
secondary schooling: high school graduation, the attain-
ment of state competency thresholds, college scholarship 
qualification, Advanced Placement (AP) and SAT scores, 
college enrollment and college choice. These new results 
address an important critique of the research linking 
school performance with MCAS:  as part of their effort 
to meet accountability standards, schools may feel pres-
sure to “teach to the test” and to focus on students who 
are most likely to contribute to score gains. By contrast, 
in addition to their intrinsic significance, most of the 
outcomes examined here are not part of the state’s high-
stakes accountability system, and therefore not subject 
to the same risk of strategic test preparation. 
As in our earlier work, the research design used in 
this study exploits randomized enrollment lotter-
ies at over-subscribed charter schools. By comparing 
randomly-admitted lottery winners and losers, instead 
of applicants who do and don’t chose to attend char-
ters, these estimates are very likely to provide reliable 
measures of the average causal effect of charter atten-
dance on charter students.
The Effect of Charter Schools on  
Postsecondary Outcomes
One of the most important questions in education 
research is whether the gains from interventions for 
which we see short-term success can be sustained. For 
example, in studies of pre-school interventions, gains 
generated by effective teachers and elementary school 
class size reductions often appear to fade as students 
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progress through school, though some of these gains 
may re-emerge later in non-cognitive outcomes.1 The 
possibility of short-lived impacts is especially relevant 
in research that relies on high-stakes assessments, which 
create pressure on schools and educators to “teach to 
the test.” The fact that schools are increasingly subject 
to intense scrutiny and evaluation based on test results 
may create incentives for teacher cheating (Jacob and 
Levitt, 2003), highly strategic instruction (Jacob, 2007) or 
an instructional focus on small groups of students that 
are pivotal for official accountability measures (Neal and 
Schanzenbach, 2010). 
The analysis here focuses on Boston’s charter high 
schools. For our purposes, an analysis of high schools 
is both a necessity and a virtue. It is necessary to study 
high schools because most students applying to char-
ters in earlier grades are not yet old enough to generate 
data on postsecondary outcomes. Charter high schools 
are also of substantial policy interest: a growing body 
of research argues that high school may be too late 
for cost-effective human capital interventions (see, for 
example, Cunha et al., 2010). Indeed, impact analyses 
of interventions for urban youth have mostly generated 
disappointing results.2 We’re interested in ascertaining 
whether charter schools, which in Massachusetts are 
largely budget-neutral, can have a substantial impact 
on the life course of affected students. The set of schools 
studied here comes from an earlier investigation of the 
effects of charter attendance in Boston on test scores 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011). The high schools in our 
earlier study, which enroll the bulk of charter high 
school students in Boston, generate statistically and 
socially significant gains on state assessments in the 10th 
grade. We turn here to the question of whether these 
gains are sustained. 
Summary of Findings
Boston’s over-subscribed charter schools generate 
impressive gains on tests taken through the Massa-
chusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). 
Lottery estimates show that each year spent at a charter 
middle school boosts MCAS scores by about a fifth of 
a standard deviation in English Language Arts (ELA) 
and more than a third of a standard deviation in math. 
High school gains are just as large (Abdulkadiroğlu et 
al., 2011). These results are in line with those generated 
by urban charters elsewhere in Massachusetts, as we’ve 
shown in studies of a Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP) school in Lynn, Massachusetts (Angrist et al., 
2010, 2012), and in an analysis of achievement effects 
in charter schools from around the state (Angrist et al., 
2011a,b).3
Our new findings suggest that the achievement gains 
generated by Boston’s high-performing charter high 
schools are remarkably persistent. While the students 
who were randomly offered a seat at these high schools 
graduate at about the same rate as those not offered 
a seat, lottery estimates show that charter enrollment 
produces gains on Advanced Placement (AP) tests and 
the SAT. Charter attendance roughly doubles the likeli-
hood that a student sits for an AP exam and increases 
the share of students who pass AP Calculus. Charter 
attendance does not increase the likelihood of taking 
the SAT, but it does boost scores, especially in math. 
Charter school attendance also increases the pass rate 
on the exam required for high school graduation in 
Massachusetts, with especially large effects on the 
likelihood of qualifying for a state-sponsored college 
scholarship. Other estimates suggest that charter atten-
dance may increase college enrollment, but the number 
of charter applicants old enough to be in college is still 
too small for this result to be conclusive. By contrast, 
our results show that charter attendance induces a clear 
shift from two-year to four-year colleges, with gains 
most pronounced at four-year public institutions in 
Massachusetts.  
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School Selection 
We set out to study the effect of attendance at six char-
ter high schools in Boston. Applicants to these schools 
comprise the sample used to construct the lottery-based 
estimates of charter high school achievement effects 
reported in our earlier study (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 
2011), and they account for the bulk of charter high 
school enrollment in Boston today.4 Two other charter 
high schools serving Boston students in the same period 
are now closed; one school has poor records and appears 
unsuitable for a lottery-based analysis.
Appendix Table A1 describes features of the charter 
schools included in this study, as well as those of the 
full set of charter high schools in Boston and Boston’s 
traditional public schools (including exam schools). 
Charters are classified according to whether they cover 
grades 9-12 or are limited to grades 9-12. The three 
groups of charter schools described in Table A1 are simi-
lar: Boston’s charters run a longer school year and day 
than traditional public schools. They also make frequent 
use of Saturday school. Most adhere to the No Excuses 
instructional approach. Panel B of Table A1 compares 
teacher characteristics, per-pupil expenditure and Title I 
eligibility. Charter teachers are younger than their tradi-
tional public school counterparts: 76 percent of teachers 
in our applicant sample are 32 years old or younger, 
compared to 28 percent of public school teachers. Simi-
larly, only 5 percent of (study sample) charter teachers 
are 49 years old or older, while 35 percent of public 
school teachers are at least 49. Charters spend somewhat 
less per-pupil than traditional public schools in Boston, 
though their classes are smaller (spending differences 
likely reflect differences in student mix, such as the 
number of special education and limited English profi-
cient students).5 All public schools in Boston, including 
charter schools, qualify for Title I aid.
Student Data
Massachusetts charter schools admit students by lottery 
when they have more applicants than seats. We collected 
lists of charter school applicants and information on the 
results of admissions lotteries from individual charter 
schools. Applicant lists were then matched to adminis-
trative records covering all Massachusetts public school 
students. Our analysis sample is limited to charter appli-
cants who were enrolled in a Boston Public School at the 
time they applied for a charter seat, and who applied 
for a charter school seat from fall 2002 through fall 2008. 
Additional information on applicant lotteries appears in 
the data appendix and especially Appendix Table A2.
We matched applicant records to administrative data 
using applicants’ names and year and grade of appli-
cation.6 Among applicants eligible for our study, 95 
percent were matched to state data.7 Applicants were 
excluded from the lottery analysis if they were disquali-
fied from the lottery they entered (disqualified appli-
cants mostly applied to the wrong grade). We also omit 
siblings of current charter students, late applicants, and 
some out-of-area applicants. In addition to providing 
demographic information and scores on state assess-
ments, state administrative records include AP and 
SAT scores for all public school students tested in 
Massachusetts.
Information on college enrollment and college choice 
comes from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). 
The Massachusetts Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education routinely requests an NSC match 
for Massachusetts’s high school graduates; we requested 
a supplemental match from the NSC for charter appli-
cants in our lottery sample not covered by the state 
match. NSC data record enrollment spells at partici-
pating postsecondary institutions, which account for 
94 percent of Massachusetts undergraduates. Missing 
institutions mostly run small vocational and technical 
programs.
CHAPTER TWO
Data and Sample
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Different types of outcomes generate different follow-
up horizons, depending on when they occur. We define 
the relevant horizon based on each applicant cohort’s 
projected senior year of high school.8 The earliest 
information available on baseline (pre-application) 
characteristics is from the school year ending in the 
spring of 2002. Students projected to graduate from 
high school in the spring of 2006 therefore generate the 
earliest outcomes. Outcome-specific samples range over 
projected senior years as follows:
■	 MCAS scores: These results are for students with 
projected graduation dates running from the spring 
of 2006 to the spring of 2013; the outcome here is the 
10th grade MCAS. Some students retake 10th-grade 
MCAS tests in a later grade, a score we also see. 
MCAS scores are standardized to the state score 
distribution by grade, year, and subject.
■	 AP and SAT scores: These results are for applicants 
with projected senior years from 2007-2012, includ-
ing tests taken earlier than senior year. AP and SAT 
scores are analyzed in their original units (AP scores 
run from 1-5; SAT subject scores run from 200-800).
■	 High school graduation: High school graduation data 
are for cohorts projected to finish in 2006-2011 (the 
most recent graduation year covered by state data is 
2011).
■	 College outcomes: These are for students with 
projected senior years running from 2006-2010 (the 
most recent cohort for which we have NSC data is the 
high school class of 2010).
Applicants who apply in more than one grade appear 
only once in our analysis, with data retained for the first 
application only. Baseline information for applicants for 
9th grade charter entry comes from 8th grade; baseline 
information for applicants for 5th grade charter entry 
comes from 4th grade; baseline information for appli-
cants for 6th grade charter entry comes from 4th grade 
for baseline test scores and 5th grade for demographic 
variables.
Table 1 compares charter applicants and the full sample 
of traditional BPS 9th graders. Applicants are dispropor-
tionately Black, and have higher average baseline scores 
than the traditional BPS population. Limited-English 
Proficient students are under-represented among charter 
applicants, but the proportion of applicants identified 
as qualifying for special education services is almost as 
high among charter applicants as in the traditional BPS 
population.
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TABLe 1
Descriptive Statistics
Projected Senior Year
2006-13  
(MCAS outcome sample)
2007-12  
(AP/SAT outcome sample)
2006-10  
(NSC outcome sample)
BPS 9th  
Graders
Lottery  
Applicants 
BPS 9th  
Graders
Lottery  
Applicants
BPS 9th  
Graders
Lottery  
Applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.496 0.546 0.497 0.537 0.499 0.541
Black 0.421 0.615 0.419 0.606 0.436 0.657
Hispanic 0.307 0.252 0.310 0.262 0.300 0.226
Asian 0.101 0.034 0.100 0.033 0.099 0.037
Subsidized Lunch 0.742 0.733 0.749 0.737 0.744 0.738
Special education 0.205 0.177 0.199 0.178 0.201 0.169
Limited english Proficiency 0.119 0.035 0.112 0.037 0.118 0.026
Baseline MCAS eLA -0.488 -0.286 -0.473 -0.339 -0.450 -0.268
Baseline MCAS Math -0.426 -0.302 -0.411 -0.329 -0.406 -0.340
Took any AP - - 0.267 0.313 -
Took SAT - - 0.493 0.643 -
On-time enrollment - - - 0.367 0.481
Charter Attendance 0.294 0.281 0.301
ever Offer 0.644 0.638 0.663
Initial Offer 0.289 0.310 0.298
N 29933 3527 22476 2946 19675 1886
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for charter lottery applicants and Boston Public School (BPS) students. Column (1) shows 
means for BPS attendees projected to graduate between 2006 and 2013 assuming normal academic progress from baseline. Column (2) shows 
means for charter lottery applicants in the same projected graduation year range. Column (4) shows means for the AP/SAT outcome sample 
restricted to students projected to graduate between 2007 and 2012. Column (3) shows means for BPS attendees projected to graduate in the 
same year range. Column (6) shows means for the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) outcome sample, which is restricted to students 
projected to graduate between 2006 and 2010. Column (5) shows means for BPS attendees projected to graduate in the same year range. 
Baseline grade is defined as 4th grade for Boston Collegiate, 5th grade for Boston Preparatory and Academy of the Pacific Rim, and 8th grade 
for Match, Codman Academy and City on a Hill Charter. Baseline data for BPS 9th graders is from 8th grade. 

13C h a r t e r  S c h o o l s  a n d  t h e  R o a d  t o  C o l l e g e  R e a d i n e s s
We estimate the effect of charter school attendance on 
high school graduation rates, measures of AP and SAT 
test-taking and scores, college enrollment and college 
type. As a benchmark, we also report results for 10th 
grade MCAS scores. The MCAS results are extended 
to cover two competency thresholds in Massachusetts, 
one for high school graduation and one for the state’s 
Adams Scholarship, a public university tuition waiver 
for public high school students.
Our lottery-based empirical strategy is motivated by  
the observation that charter attendance is a choice 
variable that may be correlated with students’ 
motivation, ability, or family background. This leads to 
selection bias. Suppose, for example, that parents who 
choose to send their children to a charter school are 
better informed or more educated than other parents. 
Their children may therefore be more likely to go to 
college even in a world without charter schools. In this 
scenario, we would have a positive bias in our estimate 
of the causal effect of charter attendance. 
To eliminate selection bias, we use random offers of 
charter school seats to construct instrumental variables 
(IV) estimates. The idea behind IV is to compare out-
comes between randomly selected lottery winners and 
losers, instead of comparing those who do and don’t 
choose to enroll at a charter school. We then adjust this 
comparison (known in econometrics as the reduced 
form), by dividing it by the win/loss difference in 
charter school attendance rates (known in econometrics 
as the first stage). Assuming, as seems likely, that any 
gaps revealed by the reduced form estimates of charter 
offers on outcomes are caused by the corresponding 
differences in charter enrollment, the ratio of reduced 
form to first stage estimates captures the causal effect of 
charter attendance. Because the comparisons here are 
based on random assignment, IV estimates are purged 
of the selection bias that may contaminate other sorts of 
comparisons and estimates.
To see how IV works, consider a stylized study of appli-
cants to a single charter school, say Match high school. 
Suppose (hypothetically) that 200 applicants applied for 
100 Match seats in the fall of 2006. As a consequence of 
over-subscription at Match, 100 applicants were offered 
seats randomly (again, hypothetically). The reduced 
form in this case is the difference, say, in the 10th grade 
MCAS math scores of the 100 applicants offered a seat 
and the 10th grade MCAS scores of the 100 applicants 
not offered a seat. This might be a number like .3σ; in 
other words, those offered a seat at Match score three-
tenths of a standard deviation higher on the 10th grade 
math test than those not offered a seat. Because offers are 
randomly assigned, the reduced form is very likely to be 
a good measure of the causal effect of a charter offer.
We could stop with an analysis of charter offers if 
everyone offered a charter seat takes it and no charter 
seats are obtained otherwise. In practice, however, not 
everyone offered a seat takes the offer; some appli-
cants offered a seat at Match ultimately choose to go 
elsewhere, perhaps attending a public school closer to 
where they live. At the same time, some of those not 
immediately offered a seat are offered one later, by 
virtue of the fact that they were placed on a waiting list 
or applied again the following year. Suppose that 80 
percent of those offered a seat at Match take it, while 
5 percent of those not offered a seat in this particular 
lottery nevertheless end up at Match eventually. The 
enrollment effect of an offer in Match’s 2006 lottery is 
therefore 0.8-0.05=0.75. Because offers are randomly as-
signed, it seems fair to claim that the only reason those 
offered a seat at Match have higher scores is this 75 
point difference in enrollment rates. The IV calculation 
therefore divides the reduced form effect of .3σ by the 
enrollment differential of .75. The resulting calculation 
produces
Effect of charter attendance  =  
Reduced Form 
 =  
.3σ
 =  .4σ
First Stage         .75
Thus, this calculation leads us to conclude that enroll-
ment at Match boosts 10th grade math scores by four-
tenths of a standard deviation. 
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First Stage Estimates and an  
MCAS Benchmark 
An admissions offer in a charter lottery boosts charter 
enrollment in 9th or 10th grade by an average of 23 
percentage points. This can be seen in the ever offer 
first stage estimates reported in Table 2. The columns 
labeled initial offer show that if the offer is made right 
away, the offer boosts charter enrollment by a further 
14 points (we add the two first stage effects because 
the offer variables are defined so that everyone who 
receives an initial offer also has the ever offer variable 
switched on). The overall first stage effect of an offer 
is therefore close to 40 points for those who receive an 
offer on or immediately following lottery day.9 
The relationship between lottery offers and charter 
enrollment—the size of the first stage estimates —is 
determined by the likelihood that an applicant chooses 
to accept an offer (some accepted applicants choose to 
attend a traditional public school, including one of Bos-
ton’s pilot schools, or an exam school). Similarly, some 
students who receive no offer in the lotteries for which 
we have data receive one at a later date. As always, 2SLS 
estimation adjusts for slippage between offers and en-
rollment in both directions, with the resulting estimates 
capturing causal effects for those who comply with (that 
is, enroll in a charter school in response to) the offers 
recorded in our data. 
As a benchmark, Table 2 also reports 2SLS estimates 
similar to those reported in our earlier Boston study 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011), for 10th grade MCAS 
scores. Attendance at one of the charter high schools in 
our sample boosts 10th grade ELA scores by .4σ that is, 
four-tenths of a standard deviation, while raising math 
scores by more than half of a standard deviation.10  
As noted above, the analysis here covers varying sets 
of cohorts, with less data available for an analysis of 
longer-term outcomes than for an analysis of MCAS 
scores. As a check on the representativeness of these 
subsamples, we also constructed 2SLS estimates of 
MCAS effects for the subsamples of applicants contrib-
uting to our AP/SAT and college-going analyses below. 
Estimates of effects on 10th grade MCAS scores in the 
AP/SAT and college-going samples (not reported here) 
are similar to estimates for the full MCAS sample, sug-
gesting that the short-run effects of charter attendance 
are similar for older and more recent cohorts.
Our empirical strategy is somewhat more involved than 
this stylized example suggests. The specific method used 
here, known as two-stage least squares (2SLS for short) 
is detailed in the technical appendix. Importantly, our 
2SLS estimator makes use of two sources of variation 
in charter offers. Instead of a single variable indicating 
whether applicants were randomly offered a charter 
seat, we work with two such variables: the first, called 
the initial offer instrument, is a dummy variable indicat-
ing offers made immediately following a charter school 
lottery. In addition, because some applicants who don’t 
receive offers on lottery day do so at a later date when 
their names are reached on a randomly ordered wait 
list, we also code a second instrument. The second 
instrument, called ever offer, indicates all applicants who 
eventually receive an offer, whether on lottery day or 
later. All applicants who initially receive an offer have 
both instruments switched on, while those who receive 
later offers without an initial offer have only the ever 
offer instrument switched on. Our lottery-based estima-
tion strategy therefore makes use of two pairs of reduced 
form and first stage estimates. The ratio of each reduced 
form estimate to each first stage estimate provides an 
estimate of charter effects. Our 2SLS procedure combines 
these two estimates into a single more precise estimate of 
the average causal effects of charter attendance.
Lottery Balance
The lottery-based empirical strategy is predicated 
on the notion that random assignment in admissions 
lotteries balances both the observed and unobserved 
characteristics of those who are and are not randomly 
offered charter seats. Whether this is indeed true is 
unknowable for characteristics that we don’t get to see 
such as motivation, but it’s worth checking for balance 
in observed characteristics like race, special education 
status and baseline (pre-application) test scores. Con-
sistent with the presumed random assignment used in 
charter school admissions lotteries, the demographic 
characteristics of those who were and were not offered a 
seat in a charter lottery indeed appear to be similar. This 
is documented in Appendix Table A3, which reports 
descriptive statistics for the full sample of matched ap-
plicants, as well differences by offer status for the MCAS 
analysis sample. Columns (3) and (4) show that indi-
vidual differences in mean characteristics by offer status 
are individually statistically insignificant; p-values for a 
joint test of balance are high.
TabLe 2
Lottery Estimates of Effects on 10th-Grade MCAS Scores
First Stage Outcome Mean
[s.d.]
Charter  
Enrollment EffectEver Offer Initial Offer
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized eLa     0.230***      0.140*** -0.289      0.397***
(0.042) (0.031)  [0.825]  (0.106)
N 3527
First-stage F 28.8 
Standardized Math     0.232***      0.140*** -0.237       0.545***
(0.041) (0.031)  [0.900]  (0.122)
 N 3474
First-stage F 28.8
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of boston charter attendance on 10th-grade MCaS test scores. The sample includes 
students projected to graduate between 2006 and 2013. The instrumented variable is charter attendance in 9th or 10th grade. The instruments 
are ever offer and initial offer dummies. Initial offer is equal to one when a student is offered a seat in any of the charter schools immediately 
following the lottery, while ever offer is equal to one for students offered seats at any time. Means and standard deviations in column (3) are 
for non-charter students. all 2SLS regressions control for risk sets, 10th grade calendar year dummies, race, sex, special education, limited 
english proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female by minority dummy. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the 
school-year level in 10th grade. The outcome mean and standard deviation in column 3 are for non-charter students.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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TABLe 2
Lottery Estimates of Effects on 10th-Grade MCAS Scores
First Stage Outcome Mean
[s.d.]
Charter  
Enrollment EffectEver Offer Initial Offer
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized eLA     0.230***      0.140*** -0.289      0.397***
(0.042) (0.031)  [0.825]  (0.106)
N 3527
First-stage F 28.8 
Standardized Math     0.232***      0.140*** -0.237       0.545***
(0.041) (0.031)  [0.900]  (0.122)
 N 3474
First-stage F 28.8
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on 10th-grade MCAS test scores. The sample includes 
students projected to graduate between 2006 and 2013. The instrumented variable is charter attendance in 9th or 10th grade. The instruments 
are ever offer and initial offer dummies. Initial offer is equal to one when a student is offered a seat in any of the charter schools immediately 
following the lottery, while ever offer is equal to one for students offered seats at any time. Means and standard deviations in column (3) are 
for non-charter students. All 2SLS regressions control for risk sets, 10th grade calendar year dummies, race, sex, special education, limited 
english proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female by minority dummy. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the 
school-year level in 10th grade. The outcome mean and standard deviation in column 3 are for non-charter students.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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MCAS Thresholds 
Since 2003, high school graduation in Massachusetts has 
been determined in part by 10th grade MCAS scores. 
The initial state competency standard required students 
to pass the “Needs Improvement” threshold with a 
scaled score of 220 in both math and ELA; for the gradu-
ating class of 2010, standards were increased to require 
a “Proficient” score of at least 240 in math, ELA, and 
science.11
Beginning with the high school class of 2005, the state 
has also used the MCAS to determine qualification for 
public university tuition waivers, an award known as 
the Adams Scholarship. Qualification for an Adams 
Scholarship requires MCAS scores in the “Advanced” 
category in either ELA or math, a score that is at least 
“Proficient” in subjects where the Advanced standard 
isn’t met and a total MCAS score in the upper quartile 
of the distribution of scores in a scholarship candidate’s 
home school district. Awardees receive tuition waivers 
at any Massachusetts public college or university.12
Charter school attendance has large effects on the likeli-
hood that applicants meet graduation competency stan-
dards and qualify for an Adams Scholarship. This can 
be seen in Table 3, which reports estimates separately 
by subject (indicating whether students met a subject 
specific standard or qualification) and overall. Charter 
attendance boosts the likelihood of meeting competency 
standards on a first try by 16 percentage points; this falls 
to 13 points when looking at whether applicants ever 
met competency standards. Competency gains are most 
dramatic for the likelihood of meeting the ELA standard. 
Consistent with these large gains in competency, charter 
attendance boosts the likelihood of qualifying for an 
Adams Scholarship by 18 points, a large and precisely 
estimated gain.13
Table 3 (pp 18-19) also suggests that charter schools 
shift the MCAS distribution into the upper two score 
categories. Specifically, the table documents large and 
statistically significant gains in the likelihood that char-
ter applicants earn scores at a level deemed Proficient or 
Advanced. The gains here remain substantial whether 
measured by first attempts or final scores, though only 
first-attempt scores are shifted out of the lowest into the 
second-lowest (Needs Improvement) range.
The nature of the charter-induced shift in the distribu-
tion of MCAS scores emerges clearly in Figure 1. This 
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FIguRe 1: 
 Distributions of MCAS Scaled Scores
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Notes: This figure plots smoothed MCAS scaled score distributions for 
charter lottery compliers in charter schools and traditional public schools. 
The Appendix describes methods for estimating complier distributions. The 
sample is restricted to lottery applicants projected to graduate between 2006 
and 2013 assuming normal academic progress from baseline. Dotted vertical 
lines at scaled score 220 mark MCAS needs improvement thresholds, 240 for 
MCAS proficiency thresholds, and 260 for MCAS advanced thresholds.
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TABLe 3
Lottery Estimates of Effects on MCAS Performance Categories
ELA
First Attempt Ever
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Panel A: Consequential Score Outcomes
Meets Competency Standards
for High School graduation 
0.814      0.162*** 0.831      0.148***
(0.053) (0.053)
Panel B: MCAS Categories
Needs Improvement or Higher
0.965 -0.009 0.990 -0.004
(0.024) (0.011)
Proficient or Higher 
0.656      0.167*** 0.658      0.162***
(0.062) (0.062)
Advanced or Higher 
0.083      0.188*** 0.083      0.188***
(0.036) (0.036)
 N 3523
MATH
Panel A: Consequential Score Outcomes
Meets Competency Standards
for High School graduation 
0.760   0.112* 0.803 0.082
(0.059) (0.058)
Panel B: MCAS Categories
Needs Improvement or Higher
0.915    0.081** 0.978   0.029*
(0.034) (0.015)
Proficient or Higher 
0.641    0.153** 0.645     0.132**
(0.066) (0.067)
Advanced or Higher 
0.314      0.260*** 0.314      0.260***
(0.062) (0.062)
 N 3471
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The x-axis in Figure 1 marks MCAS score category 
cutoffs; these occur at 20 point intervals. Charter school 
attendance clearly pushes the first-attempt score distri-
bution to the right, into the upper three score groups. 
The effect of charter attendance on ELA scores is most 
striking: very few non-charter students achieve at an 
Advanced level, while the distribution for those who 
enroll in a charter school has substantial numbers of 
compliers in the Advanced group. Formal statisti-
cal tests of distributional equality (not reported here) 
confirm that the distributional shifts documented in this 
figure are very unlikely to be merely a chance finding. 
figure plots estimated score distributions for a subsam-
ples of applicants identified as being responsive to the 
offer of a charter seat. This group, known in econometric 
terminology as the group of compliers, is defined as the 
set of applicants who take a charter seat when offered 
one in a lottery, but enroll in a traditional public school 
otherwise. We plot distributions for compliers because, 
as with our 2SLS estimates, comparisons of distribu-
tions for compliers are purged of the selection bias that 
contaminates comparisons between those who do and 
don’t enroll in a charter school.14
Combined
First Attempt Ever
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Panel A: Consequential Score Outcomes
Meets Competency Standards
for High School graduation 
0.697 0.161** 0.744  0.132*
(0.067) (0.068)
eligible for Adams Scholarship 
0.151      0.183***
(0.062)
Panel B: MCAS Categories
Needs Improvement or Higher
0.904    0.081** 0.976 0.022
(0.036) (0.016)
Proficient or Higher 
0.538    0.157** 0.540 0.152**
(0.073) (0.075)
Advanced or Higher 
0.068      0.167*** 0.068     0.167***
(0.035) (0.035)
 N 3523
Lottery Estimates of Effects on MCAS Performance Categories continued
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on MCAS requirements for high school graduation, 
qualification for an Adams Scholarship, and attainment of MCAS score categories. The Competency Determination requires scores of 220 in 
eLA and math for the classes of 2006-2009, and scores of 240 for the classes of 2010-2013. A student is eligible for the Adams Scholarship if 
he is proficient on both tests, advanced in either subject, and scores among the top 25% of the Boston district on his first attempt. A student 
“needs improvement” if he scores at or above 220 on both tests; “is proficient” if he scores at or above 240 on both tests; “is advanced” if he 
scores at or above 260 on both tests. See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Figure 2 summarizes the average effect of charter atten-
dance on MCAS categories and threshold. Gaps between 
charter and non-charter averages for each outcome in 
the figure are significantly different from zero.
AP Taking and Scores
Advanced Placement coursework allows high school 
students to experience the rigor of college-level courses 
and perhaps even earn college credit. Five of the six 
charter schools in our sample offer AP classes, and one 
school requires their students to pass AP tests to gradu-
ate. As shown in Table 4, charter school attendance 
increases the likelihood that a student takes at least one 
AP test by 28 percentage points. Consequently, more 
than half of charter students take at least one AP test, 
compared with about a quarter of the students in tradi-
tional public schools.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Charter StudentsTraditional Public Students
AdvancedProficient 
or Higher
Needs 
Improvement 
or Higher
Eligible for 
Adams 
Scholarship
Meets MCAS 
Competency 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
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Competency and MCAS Categories
Lottery Estimates of the Effects of Boston Charter Attendance 
NOTe: Solid bars indicate statistically significant differences.
TABLe 4
Lottery Estimates of Effects on Advanced Placement Test-taking and Scores
All AP Exams Science Calculus US History English  
Mean
(1)
Enroll-
ment 
Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enroll-
ment 
Effect
(4)
Mean
(5)
Enroll-
ment 
Effect
(6)
Mean
(7)
Enroll-
ment 
Effect
(8)
Mean
(9)
Enroll-
ment 
Effect
(10)
Took exam
0.267   0.284*** 0.100 0.323*** 0.062 0.210*** 0.034  0.177* 0.148 0.075
(0.073) (0.060) (0.070) (0.093) (0.078)
Number of exams
0.513   0.954*** 0.113 0.312***
(0.274) (0.069)
Score 2 or Higher
0.137 0.153** 0.028 0.043 0.018 0.086* 0.023 0.056 0.087 0.070
(0.068) (0.032) (0.045) (0.048) (0.053)
Score 3 or Higher
0.070 0.095* 0.016 0.020 0.015 0.072* 0.014 0.027 0.024 0.034
(0.051) (0.014) (0.040) (0.019) (0.027)
Score 4 or 5 
0.039 0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.008 0.021 0.007 -0.010 0.009 0.003
(0.033) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on AP test-taking and scores. The sample (N=2946) 
includes students projected to graduate between 2007 and 2012. Scores are coded as zero for students who never took AP exams. Science 
subjects include Biology, Chemistry, Physics B, Physics Mechanics, Physics electricity/Magnetism, Computer Science A, Computer Science 
AB, and environmental Science. Outcomes for Calculus combine Calculus AB and Calculus BC. Outcomes for english combine english 
Literature and english Language. See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Charter attendance increases the number of AP tests 
taken by nearly a full additional exam, a result that can 
be seen in the second row of Table 4. At the same time, 
gains in AP scores are more modest. Charter school 
attendance increases the likelihood of taking a test and 
earning a score of at least 2 by 15 percentage points, a 
statistically and quantitatively significant gain. But a 
score of 3 or better is usually required to earn college 
credit, and many colleges and universities require at 
least a 4. Charter attendance increases the probability 
of earning a score of 3 by a marginally significant 9.5 
percentage points, but generates no significant increase 
in the likelihood of earning a 4 or 5. (Note that by 
including zeros for non-takers in this analysis of score 
impact, we avoid bias from composition changes due to 
the large effect of charter attendance on the likelihood 
applicants ever take a test.)
Estimates of the effect of charter attendance on AP 
scores by subject, reported in columns 3-10 of Table 
4, show a large increase in the likelihood that charter 
applicants take tests in science, calculus, and history, 
three of the most commonly taken AP exams. Parallel-
ing charter schools’ large impact on MCAS math scores, 
the clearest AP score gains are for calculus. Charter 
attendance boosts the probability of taking the AP calcu-
lus test by 21 percentage points, and appears to boost 
the likelihood of earning a score of at least 2 by nearly 
9 points. The corresponding impact on the likelihood 
of earning a 3 on AP calculus is 7 percentage points, 
though the estimated increases in the likelihood of scor-
ing 2 or 3 are only marginally statistically significant. 
Charter attendance increases test-taking in science and 
US history, with no corresponding impact on scores 
in these subjects. Charter schools have little effect on 
English test-taking or scores.
Figure 3 summarizes the effects of charter attendance on 
AP test taking and scores. For three out of four outcomes 
in the figure, the estimated effect of charter attendance is 
at least marginally significantly different from zero.
SAT Taking and Scores
The SAT is a major milestone for college bound high 
school students and, for many, a major hurdle on the 
road to college. Designed to be challenging for all 
students, low SAT scores are a special concern for poor 
and minority students. Gaps in SAT scores by race and 
Figure 3: 
AP Test Taking and Exam Scores
Lottery Estimates of the Effects of Boston Charter Attendance
NOTe: Solid bars indicate statistically significant differences.
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socioeconomic status that might be attributable to family 
background and school quality are further accentuated 
by the willingness of higher income families to invest 
heavily in SAT preparation classes (see, e.g., Bowen and 
Bok, 2002).
Many of Boston’s traditional public school students take 
the SAT, and charter attendance does little to increase 
this rate further. As can be seen in the first two columns 
of Table 5, among our applicants, close to two-thirds 
of non-charter students take the SAT, while the esti-
mated effect of charter attendance on SAT taking is a 
modest 3 points, a gap far from statistical or economic 
significance.15 
Although charter attendance has little effect on the rate 
at which applicants take the SAT, charter attendance 
raises the SAT scores that applicants earn on the test. In 
particular, coding scores as zero for non-takers, charter 
attendances pushes the SAT composite score (the sum 
of math, verbal, and writing scores) above the bottom 
quartile of the state composite score distribution by 11 
percentage points. Gains in math contribute most to the 
shift in composite scores; effects on verbal and writing 
scores are smaller (the estimated low-end shift in verbal 
scores is marginally significant). Charter attendance 
also raises the probability that applicants earn an SAT 
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TABLe 5
Lottery Estimates of Effects on SAT Test-taking and Scores
Taking Reasoning (1600) Composite (2400)
Mean
[s.d.]
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
[s.d.]
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Mean
[s.d.]
(5)
Enrollment Effect
(6)
Took SAT
0.636 0.028
      [0.481] (0.078)
Score Above MA 
Bottom Quartile
 0.254     0.133** 0.254   0.115*
 [0.436] (0.066) [0.436] (0.067)
Score Above MA 
Median
 0.093     0.112** 0.083    0.099**
[0.290] (0.049) [0.275] (0.040)
Score In MA Top 
Quartile
 0.026 0.000 0.019 -0.010
 [0.160] (0.016) [0.138] (0.017)
N 2946
Average Score 
(For takers)
846.8 74.0** 1254.7 100.7**
[166.5] (29.1) [240.0] (43.0)
 N 1895
Math (800) Verbal(800) Writing (800)
Mean
[s.d.]
(1)
Enrollment Effect 
(2)
Mean
[s.d.]
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Mean
[s.d.]
(5)
Enrollment Effect
(6)
Score Above MA 
Bottom Quartile
0.301    0.162**  0.264      0.120** 0.279 0.106
[0.459] (0.080)  [0.441] (0.060) [0.449] (0.067)
Score Above MA 
Median
0.117    0.143**  0.102 0.063 0.096 0.053
[0.321] (0.057)  [0.303] (0.046) [0.295] (0.041)
Score In MA Top 
Quartile
0.033 0.046  0.025 -0.019 0.083    0.099**
[0.178] (0.028)  [0.158] (0.021) [0.275] (0.040)
N 2946
Average Score 
(For takers)
434.3 51.1*** 412.5 22.8 408.0 26.7*
[95.5] (17.0) [87.3] (15.7) [86.7] (16.2)
 N 1895
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on SAT test-taking and scores. The sample includes 
students projected to graduate between 2007 and 2012. Outcomes are based on the most recent score available. Means and standard deviations 
are for non-charter students. All other outcomes are equal to zero for non-SAT takers. Column headings show the maximum score for each 
subject or composite. uS average and standard deviations for 2012 are 512 (117) for math; 496 (114) for verbal; 488 (114) for writing; 1010 (214) 
for reasoning; 1498 (316) for composite. See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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MCAS math effect reported in Table 2, suggesting that 
the math skills demonstrated on the MCAS carry over 
to the SAT. Although charter attendance has smaller 
effects on verbal and writing scores, the composite SAT 
score gain is estimated to be a little over 100 points, a 
large and statistically significant result. The gain here 
amounts to almost one-third of a standard deviation in 
the US composite score distribution. The correspond-
ing effect on the SAT reasoning score is 74 points, also a 
large gain.
The effect of charter attendance on the SAT score distri-
bution is summarized in Figure 4, which plots the distri-
bution of SAT scores for treated and untreated charter 
lottery compliers (as in Figure 1, the set of compliers 
consists of applicants who respond to the offer of a char-
reasoning score (the sum of math and verbal) above the 
state median by 13 percentage points, with math again 
the largest contributor to this gain.
Table 5 also reports estimates of charter enrollment 
effects on SAT scores, estimated in samples limited to 
those who take the test. Because charter attendance 
has little effect on the decision to take the SAT, such 
conditional comparisons are unlikely to be biased by 
compositional shifts. The conditional results show that 
Boston’s charters have large, statistically significant 
effects on SAT scores, especially in math. Specifically, 
charter attendance boosts average math scores by 51 
points, a gain that amounts to more than four-tenths of 
a standard deviation in the US score distribution.16 This 
is almost as large (in standard deviation units) as the 
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ter seat by enrolling; comparisons for this group have a 
causal interpretation). Charter school attendance causes 
a pronounced rightward shift in score distributions for 
all three SAT subjects, as well as in the distribution of 
composite scores. Formal statistical tests of distribu-
tional equality (not reported here) suggest these shifts 
are very unlikely to be a chance finding. On balance, 
therefore, Boston charters produce impressive gains on 
the SAT as well as the MCAS.
High School Graduation
As we saw in Table 3, charter attendance increases the 
likelihood that charter applicants meet the MCAS-based 
standard for a high school diploma and qualify for an 
Adams Scholarship at the University of Massachusetts. 
Does charter attendance also increase high school 
graduation rates? Perhaps surprisingly, the estimates 
in Table 6 suggest not, or at least, not be enough for a 
statistically significant result. 
The estimated effect of charter attendance on the 
likelihood a student graduates high school on time is 
a statistically insignificant (negative) effect of about 
-.11.17 On the other hand, looking instead at whether 
applicants graduate within two years of their on-time 
graduation date (on time graduation dates assume no 
grade repetition), charter attendance seems to produce 
an increase of four percentage points. The estimated 
increase in graduation rates omitting transfers and 
deceased students (and thereby following the official 
state definition of high school graduation rates) is about 
.10, though here too the estimates are not significantly 
different from zero. 
The estimated effects of charter attendance on grade 
repetition (including partial grade repetition), also 
reported in Table 6, provide a possible explanation for 
why the gains in high school competency documented 
in Table 3 fail to generate clear and statistically signifi-
cant increases in high school graduation rates. Charter 
schools appear to be more likely than traditional public 
schools to hold their students back or to cause them 
to repeat a grade. Interestingly, although grade reten-
tion effects are small (and, here too, not significantly 
different from zero), adding repetition effects to the 
within-two graduation effect comes close to accounting 
for the change in competency rates induced by charter 
attendance.
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TABLe 6
Lottery Estimates of Effects on High School Graduation and Grade Repetition
Excl. Transferred and Deceased
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Graduation Outcomes
graduate On-time
0.685 -0.107 0.726 -0.089
(0.067) (0.071)
N 2597 2444
graduate Within Two
0.787 0.043 0.828 0.099
(0.073) (0.074)
Repeat grade for at least one semester
0.203 0.078 0.193 0.068
(0.074) (0.075)
Repeat at least one entire grade, or 
repeat more than one grade
0.142 0.060 0.141 0.057
(0.061) (0.063)
N 1886 1777
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on high school graduation, grade repetition and scheduled 
test-taking. On-time graduation is equal to one if a student graduates before or in the year of his projected graduation year. The sample 
for on-time graduation includes students projected to graduate between 2006 and 2011. graduate within two is equal to one if a student 
graduates by the year following projected graduation year. grade repetition outcomes are defined in two ways: is equal to one if a student 
repeats a grade for at least one semester of any grade; repeats entire grade at least once or repeating more than one grade. The sample for 
graduate within two and grade repetition includes students projected to graduate by Spring 2011. Columns (3) and (4) remove transferred or 
deceased applicants. See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Boston’s charter high schools appear to boost their stu-
dents’ SAT scores, AP calculus scores and AP participa-
tion rates, and the likelihood that students meet gradu-
ation standards and qualify for an Adams scholarship. 
These results suggest charters improve their students’ 
preparation for college. We turn here to the effects of 
charter attendance on the likelihood that students go to 
college and the type of college they attend. The college 
sample is necessarily smaller than the sample used to 
analyze effects on earlier milestones, and the findings 
therefore less precise and more preliminary in nature. 
To allow for the fact that charter schools may increase 
grade repetition, thereby delaying college applications, 
the college analysis looks at two sets of outcomes. The 
first set, with results reported in the first two columns 
of Table 7, measures outcomes assuming students 
graduate high school on time, that is, assuming no 
grade repetition. The second set, reported in columns 
3-4 of the table, look at outcomes in a longer window, 
allowing for delayed college enrollment of up to two 
years. A consequence of stretching the follow-up period 
in this manner is a further reduction in sample size.
The estimates in column 2 of Table 7 suggest charter at-
tendance increases college enrollment by about six per-
centage points in the on time sample, an estimate that 
rises to 13 points in the within-two sample. Although 
substantial, neither estimate is statistically significantly 
different from zero; in other words, we can’t rule out 
the possibility that these might be chance findings. The 
relative lack of precision here is a natural consequence 
of the fact that only about half of our charter applicants 
are old enough to have reached college enrollment 
milestones. Given the currently available sample size, 
college enrollment effects would have to be very large 
indeed (on the order of 25-30 points) for us expect a 
statistically significant finding. In ongoing work, we’re 
continuing to collect charter applicant data and plan to 
update published results accordingly. 
Table 7 also reports results for enrollment in differ-
ent sorts of post-secondary institutions. Charter school 
attendance shifts many students toward four-year 
institutions. In the on-time enrollment sample, charter 
attendance reduces the likelihood that a student at-
tends a two-year school by 10 percentage points while 
increasing the probability of four-year enrollment by 16 
percentage points. In the within-two sample, the four 
year enrollment gain is 23 percentage points. 
The estimates likewise show a large shift toward four 
year public colleges and universities, with an estimated 
gain of 19 percentage points in the on-time sample and 
37 percentage points in the within-two sample. The gain 
here is partly due to the shift toward four-year from 
two-year schools, while also (to a lesser extent) reflect-
ing a shift out of private schools in the within-two sam-
ple. Both the four-year shift and the shift toward public 
institutions are large enough to be significantly different 
from zero. The estimated decline in private enrollment 
in the within two sample is about 14 points, a decline 
that falls short of statistical significance, but nevertheless 
contributes to the public enrollment increase.
The last row of Panel A in Table 7 shows that much of 
the increase in four-year public enrollment occurs at 
Massachusetts public schools. This may be driven by the 
Adams Scholarship, which induces students to attend 
Massachusetts public universities; earlier, we noted that 
Boston charters significantly boost the probability that 
students qualify for this scholarship. Consistent with 
these results, the institution with the largest enrollment 
of former charter students in our sample is the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts at Boston.
Panel B of Table 7 reports college enrollment effects 
by selectivity tier, as defined by the Barron’s ranking 
system. In the within-two sample, we see that charters 
increase enrollment at schools in the second-to-least 
selective Barron’s tier (“competitive” colleges). These 
results provide weak evidence toward moderately more 
selective institutions. Specifically, charter attendance 
appears to increase the likelihood that students 
CHAPTER FIVE
College Enrollment and College Choice
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TABLe 7
Lottery Estimates of Effects on College Enrollment
Enrolled On-time Enrolled Within Two
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Panel A: Attendance at Any NSC-Covered School
Any
0.491 0.059 0.607 0.131
(0.083) (0.120)
Two-year
0.121 -0.104* 0.198 -0.095
(0.055) (0.093)
Four-year
0.370    0.163** 0.409  0.225**
(0.079) (0.110)
Four-year Public
0.135     0.185*** 0.129    0.367***
(0.068) (0.113)
Four-year Private
0.235 -0.022 0.279 -0.142
(0.086) (0.151)
Four-year Public In MA
0.114    0.140** 0.105    0.284***
(0.061) (0.100)
Panel B: Attendance at Barron’s-Ranked Schools
Lowest Selectivity Tier Only
0.208 -0.009 0.305 -0.043
(0.063) (0.103)
Second Lowest Selectivity Tier Only
0.193 0.052 0.188 0.183*
(0.070) (0.098)
Top Three Selectivity Tiers
0.090 0.016 0.114 -0.009
(0.047) (0.080)
N 1886 1382
Notes:  This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter school attendance on college enrollment. On-time enrollment is 
defined as enrolling by the semester after projected high school graduation, while enrollment within two years is defined as enrolling within 
two fall semesters after projected high school graduation. The on-time enrollment sample includes students projected to graduate in 2010 or 
earlier. The within-two sample is restricted to students projected to graduate in 2009 or earlier, so that within-two enrollment can be observed. 
See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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ultimately enroll in schools ranked in Barron’s second 
selectivity tier. This finding weighs against concerns that 
the shift toward public institutions comes at the expense 
of college selectivity.18 
Figure 5 summarizes the effects of charter attendance 
on college attendance and institution type in the within-
two sample. Significant results in the figure are for four-
year enrollment variables only.
FIguRe 5
College Enrollment Within Two Years of  
Expected High School Graduation
Lottery Estimates of the Effects of Boston Charter Attendance
NOTe: Solid bars indicate statistically significant differences.
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The Peer Channel 
Charter schools are sometimes said to generate gains 
by the selective retention of higher performing students 
(see, for example, Skinner (2009)). In other words, char-
ters are said to kick out trouble-makers and stragglers, 
leaving a student population that’s easier to teach. 
Importantly, the causal interpretation of our lottery-
based estimation strategy is unaffected by selective 
retention because we follow all winners and losers, 
regardless of whether they stay in charter. Moreover, the 
charter enrollment variable is “switched on” even for 
students who spend only a single day enrolled in a char-
ter school. Thus, outcomes for poor performing charter 
students who leave the school still “count” on the char-
ter side of our IV estimation strategy. 
At the same time, selective retention by charter schools, 
if substantial, may lead to a favorable population mix 
that generates positive peer effects on students who 
remain enrolled in charters. In other words, charter 
schools may do well for most of their students in part 
because a few bad apples who would otherwise be 
disruptive to all, or slow the class down, are encour-
aged to leave. While not invalidating the evidence of 
gains reported here, this peer channel has different 
policy implications than other explanations for charter 
effectiveness, such as differences in teacher training or 
effectiveness. 
We explore the peer channel by looking directly at 
school switching and peer composition. School switch-
ing is defined as being observed in two or more schools 
after a lottery application. Boston’s high school popu-
lation is highly mobile: more than one-third of our 
applicant sample changes schools by this measure. It’s 
of interest to know whether the switching rate is higher 
for charter students than others. Peer composition is 
measured as the average baseline scores of grade-mates 
at the start of 9th and 10th grade. Because charter appli-
cants are positively selected (i.e., have higher baseline 
scores than other BPS students, on average), we expect 
to see some effect of charter enrollment on peer compo-
sition (recall that charter enrollment is defined here 
using data from 9th grade). The evolution of peer compo-
sition effects from 9th to 10th grades tells us how charter 
schools change the post-enrollment peer mix.
Table 8 shows that Charter enrollment raises the likeli-
hood of school switching by about 12 percentage points, 
though this change is not significantly different from 
zero. As can be seen in column 2 of the table, however, 
the switching effect increases further to .143, a margin-
ally significant finding, when switching is defined to 
omit natural transitional grades such as 6-to-7 (some 
charters have an unusual grade structure, a fact that 
might increase transition rates). 
Might this evidence of differential switching account for 
the charter school gains reported here? Panel B assesses 
the explanatory power of the peer channel by showing 
the effect of charter enrollment on realized peer quality 
in 9th and 10th grade. Not surprisingly given the posi-
tive selection of charter applicants, charter enrollment is 
associated with sharp gains in peer achievement in 9th 
grade: the effect here is close to two-tenths of a standard 
deviation and significantly different from zero. The peer 
effect would be even larger if not for the fact, docu-
mented in the last row of Panel A, that charter enroll-
ment reduces exam school enrollment. In other words, a 
likely alternative for many charter students is an exam 
school, which also has positively selected peers. 
Importantly, the effect of charter enrollment on peer 
quality falls for 10th grade peers, compared with the 
effect of charter enrollment on 9th grade peers. This is 
apparent in the estimated peer effect of .1 in 10th grade 
peer, reported in column 4 of Table 8. In other words, the 
effect of charter attendance on student peer characteris-
tics in 10th grade, presumably determined after the exit 
of “bad apples,” is, in practice, less favorable than the 
effect on initial peer mix. This finding weighs against 
the notion that charter schools act to retain good peers, 
though clearly charter enrollment improves average 
peer composition initially.19
CHAPTER SIX
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TABLe 8
Estimates of Effects on School Switching and Realized Peer Quality
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Panel A: School Switching
Any Switch to observed schools
0.358 0.116
(0.085)
N 3074
Switch to observed schools omitting 
transitional grades
0.329  0.143*
(0.081)
N 3064
ever attend an exam school
0.145  -0.099**
(0.042)
N 3194
Panel B: Peer Quality in 9th Grade and 10th Grade
Grade 9 Grade 10
Peer Baseline eLA 
-0.382     0.177*** -0.355 0.103
(0.065) (0.066)
N 3664 3730
Peer Baseline Math 
-0.378    0.164** -0.341 0.112
(0.071) (0.070)
N 3672 3742
Peer Baseline Sum of eLA and Math
-0.745    0.318** -0.680 0.205
(0.132) (0.132)
N 3663 3727
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on school switching and realized peer quality. School-
switching estimates are based on the sample of applicants projected to graduate between 2006 and 2012, and realized peer quality estimates 
are based on the MCAS outcome sample. A student switches if he is observed to be in two or more schools in any grades after lottery 
application. exam school attendance is equal to one if a student is observed attending an exam school any time after the lottery and zero 
otherwise. Peer quality is measured as the average baseline scores of other students in the same school and year. See Table 2 notes for 
additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Effects on Special Education Students
One of the most important issues in the debate over 
school reform is whether students with special needs are 
well-served by schools of different types. Because char-
ter seats are randomly assigned to applicants at over-
subscribed schools, special education and LEP students 
are just as likely to be offered seats as are other appli-
cants in our sample. Demographic differences in charter 
enrollment are therefore driven primarily by differences 
among applicants. There are too few LEP students in our 
applicant sample for a separate investigation of charter 
effects in this subpopulation to be fruitful, but special 
education students apply to charters at almost the 
same rate as other students in the district. We therefore 
explore the consequences of charter enrollment for the 
subsample of almost 20 percent of applicants identified 
as qualifying for special education services.20 
The analysis here groups students by baseline special 
education status, that is, special education status as 
recorded in state administrative data in the same year 
that our baseline test scores were generated, before char-
ter enrollment. We use a baseline definition of special 
education status out of a concern that charter schools 
might choose to reclassify students in one way or 
another. As it turns out, however, this concern is largely 
unfounded: the effect of charter enrollment on special 
education status is small and not significantly different 
from zero (see appendix Table A5 for details). 
Estimated effects of charter enrollment by special educa-
tion status show achievement gains at least as large 
for special education students as for others, as can be 
seen in Panel A of Table 9. Indeed, the overall effect of 
charter attendance on the likelihood of meeting compe-
tency standards is almost entirely is due to the gains in 
the special education group. Gains in competency rates 
among special education students are an impressive 52 
percentage points, in comparison with an insignificant 
gain of about 9 points in competency rates among other 
students. Charter attendance also increases Adams 
Scholarship attainment in the special education group, 
though here the gains are more modest than for others. 
This is not surprising since most special education 
students are much farther from Adams qualification to 
start with.
Differences in the impact of charter enrollment by 
special education status are less clear for AP tests than 
for MCAS outcomes. Panel B of Table 9 suggests char-
ter enrollment affects AP taking similarly in the two 
subsamples, though with a larger gain in calculus taking 
in the non-special-education group. Calculus score 
effects are also large for non-special education students, 
though not large enough for differences in score effects 
by special education status to be statistically meaning-
ful. Interestingly, however, Panel C shows markedly 
larger SAT score gains among special education students 
than for other applicants. 
Special education students are significantly less likely 
to graduate high school on time than are other students, 
as can be seen in the mean graduation rates reported in 
columns 1 and 3 of Panel D. Charter attendance seems 
to hold some special education students back, reduc-
ing on time graduation rates in the special education 
subsample. The charter effect on within two graduation 
rates for special education students, however, is not 
significantly different from zero. 
The sample of special education students available for a 
college-going analysis is small, so the resulting estimates 
are necessarily imprecise. As can be seen in Panel E of 
Table 9, however, the estimated enrollment effects at 
schools of all types are much larger in the special educa-
tion subsample than for other students. These results 
are imprecise and should be seen as preliminary and 
suggestive; we’ll expand the analysis here as more data 
become available. Even now, however, findings in other 
areas seem reasonably conclusive: charter attendance 
increases the rate at which special education students 
meet state competency standards markedly, and appears 
to generate increased human capital for special educa-
tion students, as evidenced by especially large gains in 
MCAS and SAT scores.
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TABLe 9
Estimates of Effects by Baseline Special Education Classifications
Non Special Education Special Education
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Panel A: 10th- Grade MCAS
Standardized eLA
-0.144     0.349*** -1.007   0.572**
(0.110) (0.262)
Standardized Math
-0.106     0.522*** -0.896     0.679***
(0.131) (0.245)
Meets Competency Standard (First Attempt)
0.763 0.089 0.363     0.510***
(0.072) (0.131)
Adams Scholarship eligibility
0.174      0.198*** 0.035  0.094*
(0.074) (0.052)
N 2850 598
Panel B: AP Outcomes
Took any AP
0.309      0.276*** 0.064      0.280***
(0.083) (0.107)
Took AP Calculus
0.071     0.227*** 0.019  0.130*
(0.077) (0.078)
Score 3 or Higher, any AP
0.082 0.108 0.014 0.014
(0.065) (0.058)
Score 3 or Higher, Calculus
0.016 0.090* 0.006 0.004
(0.050) (0.042)
N 2423 523
Panel C: SAT Outcomes
Took SAT
0.673 0.067 0.458 -0.165
(0.080) (0.175)
N 2423 523
SAT Math (800)
443.5 50.9*** 368.1 49.9
(19.1) (34.3)
SAT Reasoning (1600)
863.6 66.0** 726.4 103.7*
(31.3) (58.3)
SAT Composite (2400)
1280.4    90.0** 1070.5 164.0**
(45.4) (82.3)
N 1648 247
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Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on subgroups defined by baseline special education status. 
See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Panel D: High School Graduation
graduate On-time
0.705 -0.072 0.586   -0.375**
(0.075)  (0.179)
N 2145 452
graduate Within Two
0.805 0.062 0.690 -0.111
(0.076)  (0.219)
N 1568 318
Panel E: College Enrollment Within Two
Any
0.635 0.092 0.441  0.522
(0.121)  (0.697)
4-year
0.440 0.178 0.224  0.874
(0.123) (0.672)
4-year Public
0.147      0.348*** 0.028 0.614*
(0.121)  (0.367)
 N 1158 224
Non Special Education Special Education
Mean
(1)
Enrollment Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Enrollment Effect
(4)
Estimates of Effects by Baseline Special Education Classifications  continued
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Studies of many educational interventions show prom-
ising short-run gains, followed by discouragingly fast 
fadeout. This study uses randomized entrance lotteries 
to ask whether the substantial short-run test score effects 
generated by Boston’s charter high schools translate into 
gains on longer-run outcomes like Advanced Placement 
test-taking and scores, SAT scores, college attendance 
and college choice. Our estimates suggest that the effects 
of Boston’s charters are remarkably persistent. Specifi-
cally, charter attendance raises the probability that stu-
dents pass high-stakes exams required for high-school 
graduation, boosts the likelihood that students qualify 
for an exam-based college scholarship, increases the 
frequency of AP test-taking, substantially increases SAT 
scores and shifts students away from two-year colleges 
toward four-year schools. The effect of charter atten-
dance on the probability of attending a four-year public 
institution in Massachusetts is particularly large.
In view of often-voiced concerns about the effect of 
charter schools on student attrition, we explore a pos-
sible explanation for these gains in the form of school 
switching and peer effects. Charter attendance increases 
school switching outside of transitional grades, but this 
does not accentuate the effect of charter enrollment on 
peer composition. If anything, charter peers become 
more like other peers as students progress from 9th 
grade to 10th grade. Motivated by concerns about how 
charters serve special needs students, we also report 
estimates for a special education subsample, a group 
well represented at Boston’s charter high schools. With 
the exception of Adams Scholarship qualification and a 
possible delay in high school graduation, special educa-
tion students seem to get as much or more from charter 
attendance as does the general applicant population.
These results suggest that the short-run test score im-
pacts reported in our previous work on Boston’s charter 
schools are not driven by strategic gaming or teaching 
to the test; rather, they seem to represent increases in 
underlying human capital, with effects that emerge in a 
variety of outcomes. The cohorts of lottery applicants in 
our sample are too young to generate reliable estimates 
of effects on college persistence or graduation. In future 
work, we plan to investigate the effects of Boston’s 
charter schools on later college outcomes, as well as on 
longer-run labor market variables like employment and 
earnings.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Summary and Conclusions
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Data Appendix
The data used for this study come from several sources. Lists of charter applicants and lottery winners are derived 
from records provided by individual charter schools. Information on schools attended and student demographics 
come from the Student Information Management System (SIMS), a centralized database that covers all public school 
students in Massachusetts. Standardized test scores are from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System 
(MCAS). Advanced Placement (AP) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores are provided by the College Board. 
College attendance information comes from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). This Appendix describes 
each data source and details the procedures used to clean and match them.
Lottery Data
Data description and sample restrictions
Our sample of applicants is obtained from records of lotteries held at six Massachusetts charter schools between 
2002 and 2009. The participating schools and lottery years are listed in Table A2. A total of 24 school-specific entry 
cohorts are included in the analysis. Lotteries for three participating schools, Match, Codman Academy and City on 
a Hill, were conducted for entry to 9th grade; two schools, Boston Preparatory and Academy of the Pacific Rim, held 
lotteries for 6th grade entry. Records for Boston Collegiate are from 5th grade lotteries.
The raw lottery records typically include applicants’ names, dates of birth, contact information and other 
information used to define lottery groups, such as sibling status. The first five rows in Table A2 show the sample 
restrictions we impose on the raw lottery records. We exclude duplicate applicants and applicants listed as applying 
to the wrong entry grade. We also drop late applicants, out-of-area applicants, and sibling applicants, as these groups 
are typically not included in the standard lottery process. Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of lottery 
records from 8,840 to 8,455.
Lottery offers
In addition to the data described above, the lottery records also include information on offered seats. We used 
this to define indicator variables for whether lottery participants received randomized offers. We make use of two 
sources of variation in charter offers, which differ in timing. The initial offer instrument captures offers made on the 
day of the charter school lottery. The ever offer instrument captures offers made initially or later, as a consequence 
of movement down a randomly sequenced waiting list. The pattern of instrument availability across schools and 
applicant cohorts is documented in Panel B of Appendix Table A2. In some years, all applicants eventually received 
offers, in which case only the initial offer instrument contributes to the analysis; these cases are recorded as having 
“No Variation” in the ever offer instrument. As documented in Table 1, initial and ever offer rates were 29 and 64 
percent in our MCAS analysis sample. These rates were similar in the samples for other outcomes.
SIMS Data
Data description
Our study uses SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2011-2012 school year. Each year of data 
includes an October file and an end-of-year file. The SIMS records information on demographics and schools 
attended for all students in Massachusetts’ public schools. An observation in the SIMS refers to a student in a school 
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in a year, though there are some student-school-year duplicates for students that switch grades or programs within a 
school and year. The SIMS includes a unique student identifier known as the SASID, which is used to match students 
from other data sources as described below.
Coding of demographics and attendance
The SIMS variables used in our analysis include grade, year, name, town of residence, date of birth, sex, race, special 
education and limited English proficiency status, free or reduced price lunch and school attended. We constructed a 
wide-format data set that captures demographic and attendance information for every student in each year in which 
he or she is present in Massachusetts’ public schools. This file uses information from the longest-attended school in 
the first calendar year spent in each grade. Attendance ties were broken at random; this affects only 0.007 percent of 
records. Students classified as special education, limited English proficiency, or eligible for a free or reduced price 
lunch in any record within a school-year-grade retain that designation for the entire school-year-grade. The SIMS 
also includes exit codes for the final time a student is observed in the database. These codes are used to determine 
high school graduates and transfers.
We measure charter school attendance in 9th and 10th grade. A student is coded as attending a charter in his or her 
9th-grade or 10th-grade year when there is any SIMS record reporting charter attendance in that year. Students who 
attend more than one charter school within a year are assigned to the charter they attended longest.
MCAS Data
We use MCAS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2011-2012 school year. Each observation in the MCAS 
database records a student’s test results in a particular grade and year. The MCAS outcomes of interest are math and 
English Language Arts (ELA) tests in grade 10. We also use baseline tests taken prior to charter application, which 
are from 4th grade or 8th grade depending on a student’s application grade. The raw test score variables are stan-
dardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within a subject-grade-year in Massachusetts. We also make 
use of scaled scores, which are used to determine whether students meet MCAS competency thresholds. Unless 
otherwise noted, we only use the first test taken in a particular subject and grade. 
AP and SAT Data
We use AP and SAT data files provided to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 
by College Board. The AP and SAT files include scores on all AP exams and SAT tests for graduation cohorts 2007 
through 2012; for students who took the SAT more than once, the file includes only the score for the most recent 
exam. The AP and SAT files also include SASID identifiers, which are used to merge these outcomes with the SIMS 
database.
NSC Data
Data on college outcomes comes from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) database, which captures enroll-
ment for 94 percent of undergraduates in Massachusetts. We combine information from three separate searches of 
the NSC database:
■	 A 2010 search for all students in the SIMS database between 2002 and 2009 with projected graduation years earlier 
than 2014, assuming normal academic progress from the last observed grade and year. Note that this search was 
not restricted to students who graduated high school;
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■	 A 2011 search of students who graduated from Massachusetts public high schools in the class of 2010;
■	 A 2012 search of all students who graduated from Massachusetts public high schools in the classes of 2003 
through 2010.
All students in our charter applicant sample were included in the 2010 NSC search, and Massachusetts high school 
graduates were included in multiple searches. College types are coded using the first attended college after the last 
date a student is observed in the SIMS. NSC searches were conducted using criteria like name and date of birth; the 
NSC files also include SASIDs, which are used to merge the college outcomes with the SIMS database.
Matching Data Sets
The MCAS, AP, SAT and NSC data files were merged to the master SIMS data file using the unique SASID identifier. 
The lottery records do not include SASIDs; these records were matched manually to the SIMS by name, application 
year and application grade. In some cases, this procedure failed to produce a unique match. We accepted some 
matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade, year and town of residence seemed to make sense. 
Our matching procedure successfully located most applicants in the SIMS database. The sixth row of Panel A of 
Table A2 reports the number of applicant records matched to the SIMS in each applicant cohort. The overall match 
rate across all cohorts was 94 percent (7,953/8,455).
Once matched to the SIMS, each student is associated with a unique SASID; at this point, we can determine which 
students applied to multiple schools in our lottery sample. Following the match, we reshape the lottery data set to 
contain a single record for each student. If students applied in more than one year, we keep only records associated 
with the earliest year of application. Our lottery analysis also excludes students who did not attend a Boston 
Public Schools (BPS) school at baseline, as students applying from private schools have lower follow-up rates. This 
restriction eliminates 22 percent of charter applicants. Of the remaining 4,511 charter applicants, 3,548 (78 percent) 
contribute a score to our MCAS analysis.
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TABLe A1
Boston School Characteristics 
Public High 
Schools
Charters Serving 
Grade 9-12 
Charters Serving 
Grade 9-12 Only
Charters in the 
Study
Mean
(1)
Mean
(2)
Mean
(3)
Mean
(4)
Panel A: Charter School Characteristics 
Number of years open - 14 15 15
Days per year 180 190 189 189
Average minutes per day 389 478 477 477
Have Saturday school - 0.71 0.75 0.75
Avg. math instruction (min) - 92.0 83.5 83.5
Avg. reading instruction (min) - 92.0 89.8 89.8
No excuses - 0.71 0.75 0.75
Panel B: Comparison with Traditional Boston Public Schools
Number of teachers 45 27 19 28
Student/teacher ratio 14.6 13.0 13.6 13.3
Proportion of teachers licensed in teaching 
assignment 0.97 0.63 0.71 0.58
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 0.28 0.71 0.71 0.76
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 0.35 0.09 0.10 0.05
Proportion of core classes taught by highly 
qualified teachers 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.97
Avg. per-pupil expenditure $14,614* $14,277 $15,313 $13,990 
Title I eligible 1 1 1 1
N (schools) 21 7 4 6
Notes: This table reports characteristics of Boston charter schools and BPS operating in academic year 2012-13. Charter school characteristics 
are obtained from a survey of school administrators. Panel B compares traditional charter high schools to Boston public high schools. Data on 
public schools are from http:\\www.doe.mass.edu. Boston public high schools include Another Course to College, Boston Arts Academy, 
Boston Community Leadership Academy, Boston Latin Academy, Boston Latin School, Brighton High, Boston International High, Burke 
High, Charlestown High, Community Academy of Science and Health, Dorchester Academy, east Boston High, The english High, excel 
High, Fenway High, greater egleston High, New Mission High, O’Bryant School of Math and Science, Quincy upper, Snowden International 
High, urban Science Academy. Data for West Roxbury Academy and TechBoston Academy are missing. Boston charters serving grade 9-12 
include Academy of the Pacific Rim, Boston Preparatory, City on a Hill, Codman Academy, Boston Collegiate High, Health Careers Academy, 
and Match. Boston charter high schools serving grade 9-12 only are City on a Hill, Codman Academy, Match, Health Careers Academy. 
Statistics are based on data from 2011. *Average per-pupil expenditure is the mean of FY2010 and FY2012 per-pupil expenditures (data 
acquired from annual “At A glance” BPS publications) for all BPS schools, including middle schools and elementary schools. The statistic 
includes all salaries, instructional costs, and support services costs; it excludes all capital costs. 
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TabLe a1
Boston School Characteristics 
Public High 
Schools
Charters Serving 
Grade 9-12 
Charters Serving 
Grade 9-12 Only
Charters in the 
Study
Mean
(1)
Mean
(2)
Mean
(3)
Mean
(4)
Panel A: Charter School Characteristics 
Number of years open - 14 15 15
Days per year 180 190 189 189
average minutes per day 389 478 477 477
Have Saturday school - 0.71 0.75 0.75
avg. math instruction (min) - 92.0 83.5 83.5
avg. reading instruction (min) - 92.0 89.8 89.8
No excuses - 0.71 0.75 0.75
Panel B: Comparison with Traditional Boston Public Schools
Number of teachers 45 27 19 28
Student/teacher ratio 14.6 13.0 13.6 13.3
Proportion of teachers licensed in teaching 
assignment 0.97 0.63 0.71 0.58
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 0.28 0.71 0.71 0.76
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 0.35 0.09 0.10 0.05
Proportion of core classes taught by highly 
qualified teachers 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.97
avg. per-pupil expenditure $14,614* $14,277 $15,313 $13,990 
Title I eligible 1 1 1 1
N (schools) 21 7 4 6
Notes: This table reports characteristics of boston charter schools and bPS operating in academic year 2012-13. Charter school characteristics 
are obtained from a survey of school administrators. Panel b compares traditional charter high schools to boston public high schools. Data on 
public schools are from http:\\www.doe.mass.edu. boston public high schools include another Course to College, boston arts academy, 
boston Community Leadership academy, boston Latin academy, boston Latin School, brighton High, boston International High, burke 
High, Charlestown High, Community academy of Science and Health, Dorchester academy, east boston High, The english High, excel 
High, Fenway High, Greater egleston High, New Mission High, O’bryant School of Math and Science, Quincy Upper, Snowden International 
High, Urban Science academy. Data for West Roxbury academy and Techboston academy are missing. boston charters serving grade 9-12 
include academy of the Pacific Rim, boston Preparatory, City on a Hill, Codman academy, boston Collegiate High, Health Careers academy, 
and Match. boston charter high schools serving grade 9-12 only are City on a Hill, Codman academy, Match, Health Careers academy. 
Statistics are based on data from 2011. *average per-pupil expenditure is the mean of FY2010 and FY2012 per-pupil expenditures (data 
acquired from annual “at a Glance” bPS publications) for all bPS schools, including middle schools and elementary schools. The statistic 
includes all salaries, instructional costs, and support services costs; it excludes all capital costs. 
TabLe a2
Lottery Records
Panel A: Lottery Records
Projected Senior Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 ALL
Total number of records 600 450 940 883 1117 1533 1753 1564 8840
excluding disqualified applications 600 450 940 883 1117 1530 1753 1553 8826
excluding late applications 590 446 930 880 1117 1530 1733 1553 8779
excluding applicants from outside of area 590 446 930 880 1114 1529 1733 1535 8757
excluding siblings 570 437 905 864 1101 1482 1642 1454 8455
excluding records not matched to the SIMS 509 419 858 816 1055 1395 1547 1354 7953
Reshaping to one record per student 437 419 632 594 799 1025 1100 966 5972
excluding repeat applications 437 419 629 589 778 1005 1029 914 5800
In boston schools at baseline 289 337 511 481 605 847 751 690 4511
excluding applicants without outcome scores 232 268 419 382 483 667 568 529 3548
Notes:  Panel a summarizes the sample restrictions imposed for the lottery analysis. Disqualified applications are either within year and 
school duplicates or applications to the wrong grade. In Panel b,  the notation “Not Oversubscribed” means that every applicant received an 
offer. “Yes” means that lottery records with information on ever offer and initial offer were available, and that some applicants did not get 
offers. “Incomplete Records” indicates schools and years for which lottery records are inadequate to allow reliable coding of initial or ever 
offers. The last row shows the number of applicants to each school.  Cohorts are too young for follow-up if they don’t generate outcomes 
beyond MCaS in time for our study.  The total number of applicants represented in Panel b is 3,548. For Match 2008 applicants, we impute 
initial offer using the 2007 Match initial offer cutoff. 
Panel B: Comparison of Ever Offer and Initial Offer Records by Schools and Cohorts 
Application Year/
School
Boston  
Preparatory
Academy of 
Pacific Rim
Boston  
Collegiate City on a Hill
Codman  
Academy Match
2002
ever 
Not Open No Records
Yes Not Oversubscribed
No Records
Yes
Initial  Yes Yes Yes
2003
ever 
Not Open No Records
Yes
No Records No Records
Yes
Initial  Yes Yes
2004
ever 
Incomplete Records No Records
Yes Not Oversubscribed Yes Yes
Initial  Yes Yes Yes Yes
2005
ever Not Oversubscribed Yes Yes Yes
Incomplete Records
Yes
Initial  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2006
ever Yes
Incomplete Records
Yes
Initial  Yes Yes
2007
ever 
Too Young for Follow-up
Yes
No Records
Yes
Initial  Yes Yes
2008
ever Not Oversubscribed Yes Yes
Initial  Yes Yes Yes
2009
ever Yes Yes Yes
Initial  Yes Yes Yes
N 81 83 264 1923 155 2373
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TABLe A3
Covariate Balance
Ever offer
(1)
Initial offer
(2)
Female
0.004 0.028
(0.021) (0.020)
Black
-0.005 0.008
(0.021) (0.019)
Hispanic
0.000 -0.006
(0.018) (0.017)
Asian 
0.000 -0.005
(0.008) (0.006)
Subsidized Lunch
0.019 0.016
(0.019) (0.018)
Special education
-0.005 0.015
(0.017) (0.016)
Limited english Proficiency
0.006 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Baseline MCAS eLA 
-0.009 -0.038
(0.037) (0.036)
Baseline MCAS Math
0.004 -0.032
(0.038) (0.036)
P-Value 0.971 0.799
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of observed characteristics on lottery offers, controlling for application risk sets. 
estimates are based on the MCAS outcome sample. P-values are from tests of the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. There 3,391 
observations in the sample.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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TABLe A4
Grade 10 and Grade 12 Attrition 
Panel A: 
Observed 10th-Grade MCAS Scores and 
Grade 12 In MA Status
Panel B: Attrition Differentials by Ever Offer and Initial Offer
Either 
Math or 
ELA
 ELA  Math Grade 12 MA  ELA  Math Grade 12 MA
Projected  
Senior Year Mean(1)
Mean
(2)
Mean
(3)
Mean
(4)
Ever Offer
(5)
Initial 
Offer
(6)
Ever Offer
(7)
Initial 
Offer
(8)
Ever Offer
(9)
Initial 
Offer
(10)
2006
0.803 0.803 0.803 0.747 0.108 0.031 0.108 0.031 0.015 0.068
(0.083) (0.053) (0.083) (0.053) (0.079) (0.062)
2007
0.795 0.792 0.789 0.774 -0.038 -0.063 -0.034 -0.036 0.011 0.017
(0.058) (0.066) (0.058) (0.065) (0.057) (0.062)
2008
0.820 0.812 0.800 0.765 0.100 -0.034 0.072 -0.035 0.028 -0.011
(0.064) (0.043) (0.066) (0.045) (0.070) (0.050)
2009
0.794 0.786 0.771 0.763 -0.033 -0.061 -0.020 -0.048 -0.037 -0.050
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
2010
0.798 0.795 0.785 0.765 0.036 -0.010 0.028 -0.015 -0.033 -0.040
(0.044) (0.040) (0.045) (0.041) (0.046) (0.042)
2011
0.787 0.784 0.762 0.730 -0.005 0.039 -0.003 0.050 0.014 0.034
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
2012
0.756 0.750 0.743 0.610 0.027 -0.016 0.048 -0.007 -0.038 -0.059
(0.052) (0.036) (0.052) (0.037) (0.057) (0.041)
2013
0.767 0.764 0.751 - -0.014 0.038 -0.015 0.054 - -
(0.036) (0.043) (0.037) (0.044) - -
All Cohorts
0.787 0.782 0.770 0.726 0.007 -0.002 0.008 0.006 -0.010 -0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
N (All Cohorts) 4511 4511 3821
Notes: This table describes attrition for 10th-grade MCAS scores and 12th-grade Massachusetts status for charter school lottery applicants. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the percentage of observed MCAS scores in samples expected to have post-lottery 10th-grade MCAS test scores 
given normal academic progress after the lottery. Column (4) shows the percentage of students in Massachusetts in 12th grade among lottery 
applicants. Columns (5) and (6) report coefficients on ever offer and initial offer dummies from regressions in which the dependent variable is 
an indicator equal to one if a student has a follow-up 10th-grade eLA test score. The dependent variable in columns (7) and (8) is an indicator 
equal to one if a student has a follow-up 10th-grade math test score. The dependent variable in columns (9) and (10) is an indicator equal to 
one if a student is observed in Massachusetts in 12th grade. All regressions control for risk set dummies. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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TABLe A5
Estimates of Effects on Special Education Classifications 
Grade 10 Grade 11 Grade 12
Mean
(1)
Effect
(2)
Mean
(3)
Effect
(4)
Mean
(5)
Effect
(6)
Special education 
Status
0.156 -0.034 0.146 -0.019 0.138 -0.040
(0.028) (0.033) (0.034)
N 3194 2874 2680
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of Boston charter attendance on high school special education classifications in 10th grade through 12th 
grade. estimates are based on the sample of students projected to graduate between 2006 and 2012. See Table 2 notes for additional details.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Technical Appendix
Two-Stage Least Squares
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Endnotes
1. See, for example, studies of the effect of Head Start by Currie and Thomas (2000), Garces et al. (2002), and Deming 
(2009) and investigations of class size effects by Dynarski et al. (2011) and Chetty et al., (2011). Three randomized, 
preschool interventions generate fading effects on cognitive test scores but may affect labor force attachment and 
crime (Anderson, 2008). Teacher assignment and international educational interventions also appear to generate 
impacts that fade (see Kane and Staiger, 2008; Jacob et al., 2010; Andrabi et al., 2011; and Banerjee et al., 2007). 
2. For example, Dynarski et al. (1998) and Dynarski and Gleason (2002) document an array of discouraging 
findings for interventions meant to reduce dropout rates. Dynarski and Wood (1997) and Kemple and Snipes (2000) 
look at alternative schools and career academies, with findings that are mixed at best.
3. Since charter schools are a recent innovation, with Massachusetts’s first charter schools opening in 1995, it is not 
surprising that most evidence on charter effectiveness to date comes from outcomes measured while children are 
still enrolled in elementary and secondary school. An exception is Dobbie and Fryer (2012)’s recent lottery-based 
study, which follows applicants to a single charter middle school in the Harlem Children’s Zone, estimating the 
effects on college enrollment while also looking at non-educational outcomes related to crime and teen pregnancy. 
Dobbie and Fryer (2012) find that Promise Academy students are more likely to go to college, while girls are less 
likely to get pregnant and boys are less likely to be incarcerated. Earlier work by Booker et al. (2008) uses statistical 
controls and distance instruments to identify the effect of charter school attendance on high school graduation 
and college enrollment. Both of these empirical strategies suggest gains for charter students. We complement this 
earlier work with new results on postsecondary preparation and enrollment for a large cohort of charter high school 
students in an urban setting of considerable policy interest.
4. The six schools are Academy of the Pacific Rim, Boston Collegiate Charter School, Boston Preparatory Charter 
Public School, City on a Hill, Codman Academy Charter Public School, and Match Charter High School.
5. The BPS average, for example, covers all students educated under district auspices, including out-of-district 
special education placements, and elementary school students. 
6. Birthdays, town of residence, race or ethnicity, and gender were used to distinguish duplicate matches.
7. Match rates differ little by win/loss status. Results for applicant cohorts where match rate differentials are 
largest are similar to those for the larger sample.
8. The projected senior year equals the year in 8th grade plus 4 for applicants to City on a Hill, Codman Academy, 
and Match Charter High School (schools where applicants apply for 9th grade entry), year in 4th grade plus 8 for 
applicants to Boston Collegiate (where applicants apply for 5th grade entry), and year in 5th grade plus 7 for applicants 
to Academy of the Pacific Rim and Boston Preparatory (schools where applicants apply for 6th grade entry.)
9. First stage estimates differ slightly across outcomes due to small changes in sample composition.
10. The estimates reported in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2011) are smaller than those reported here in Table 2, because 
the former are scaled to measure the effect of years of charter attendance, while those reported here show an overall 
charter enrollment effect, without putting these in per-year terms.
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11. See http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/graduation.html for details. The new rules include an exception for 
students who pass the Needs Improvement threshold only and also meet personal goals. We ignore this exception 
here.
12. Cohodes and Goodman (2013) estimate effects of Adams Scholarships on college enrollment and choice, 
showing these appear to increase enrollment in public universities in spite of the fact that they cover only a small 
portion of college costs.
13. Charter school students can earn a scholarship in either the district of attendance (the charter school) or the 
district of residence (Boston). The two standards differ due to the requirement for a score in the upper quartile of the 
district score distribution. The Adams Scholarship cutoff is defined here using BPS thresholds.
14. Complier distributions are estimated using a variation on the methods introduced by Abadie (2002; 2003). See 
the technical appendix for details.
15. Charter applicants are positively selected, that is, have somewhat higher baseline test scores than the general 
BPS population. Consequently, the SAT-taking rate among applicants of about .64 exceeds the SAT-taking rate of 
almost half in the overall non-charter BPS population.
16. Means (and standard deviations) of the 2012 US SAT distribution were 512 (117) in math, 496 (114) in verbal, 488 
(114) in writing, 1010 (214) for SAT reasoning and 1498 (316) for the composite.
17. On time graduation dates are determined by counting from the entry grade to grade 12.
18.  In a statewide sample, Cohodes and Goodman (2013) find the Adams Scholarship causes Massachusetts 
students to forgo more selective private campuses on average. But this results emerges only for higher-income 
students.
19. Our earlier study of Boston charters shows that initial peer composition is unlikely to account for positive 
charter effects on achievement: the interaction between school-specific gains and baseline peer achievement is 
negative. In other words, charters with the most value added have the worst initial peer mix.
20. Low application rates in the LEP subpopulation may also be a concern. On the other hand, the Boston-area 
KIPP school evaluated in Angrist, et al. (2010 and 2012) enrolls many LEP students. Our earlier results suggest that 
KIPP enrollment generates substantially larger achievement gains for LEP students than for the general applicant 
population, especially in ELA. 
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